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Abstract: The paper approaches the problem of differentiation of strategies implemented by 
individual countries in the institutional competition for foreign investments by looking at the 
experience of Kazakhstan. It basically focuses on the contradiction between political bias and 
political survival effects as driving forces for development and implementation of formal 
economic institutions. Kazakhstan demonstrates how the shift of relative importance of these 
two aspects significantly influenced the country’s position in competing for FDI. Moreover, 
the paper looks at the relative importance of individual levels of institutional competition in a 
globalizing economy. 
 
 
January 2009 
1. Introduction 
 The development of new independent states in the post-Soviet Central Asia provided a 
variety of challenges from the point of view of both traditional and untraditional security 
issues. While the traditional security is directly related to the challenges of military nature, 
which are present for the most countries of the region, the untraditional security problems are 
often related to international economic competition – both global and regional – as a factor of 
regional development. In fact, two decades of independent development of the post-Soviet 
countries provide a huge variety of different economic and political responses to the changing 
international economic environment. Different countries pursue different policies towards 
foreign investors and international expansion of own businesses, economic openness and 
protection of markets. Obviously, these policies have an important impact on economic 
outcomes. The international economic competition again has many dimensions and can be 
perceived in various ways, which often differ across disciplines and fields of study. In fact, 
there are two main views on the problem, closely related to two distinct concepts of 
globalization. The first “geo-economic” approach, which experienced strong revival in recent 
years (as part of the discussion about the state wealth funds and the revival of the so-called 
“economic patriotism”, see Klinova, 2008), looks at the economic opening up in terms of 
power imbalance and considers free markets an indirect instrument of domination. Obviously 
this concept has often been applied to intergovernmental bargaining over distribution of assets 
and construction of pipelines in the region.  
The second approach looks at the free markets as subjects of power rather than 
instruments; in this case nation-states adjust their policies to the (personalized or even non-
personalized) pressure from private business groups. This paper focuses on the second aspect 
of the problem, which, to our knowledge, has received less attention in the literature, and can 
be considered from the point of view of institutional competition theory, which has been 
thoroughly studied in economics. Institutional competition describes the economic policy-
making as construction of “offers” on the market for institutions and economic policies, 
where governments compete for mobile factors of production adjusting economic policies and 
formal institutions in their jurisdictions. This view can be helpful to conceptualize the variety 
of policies of post-Soviet countries as a variety of strategies in the global and regional 
institutional competition. This paper applies this approach to studying the evolution of 
economic policy in Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan constitutes a very interesting example for our analysis because of three 
reasons. First, throughout the independent development of the country, competition for 
foreign direct investments has played a significant role in the economic policy of Kazakhstan, 
probably even to a greater extend, than in many other developing countries. Second, 
Kazakhstan, as it will be shown bellow, used two quite different approaches to its positioning 
in the institutional competition during the last two decades. The differences between the 
strategies implemented in the 1990s and the 2000s provide us with the necessary variation for 
our analysis. Third, Kazakhstan has been involved in competition on two levels: the global 
institutional competition for capital of multinationals, which all developing countries 
experience, and the regional institutional competition within the post-Soviet space, which 
became especially important in the 2000s. The degree of involvement in both types of 
competition is to a certain extend endogenous, because it depends on, respectively, unilateral 
liberalization strategies and involvement in the process of regional economic integration. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that the “geo-economic” competition and institutional competition 
are complementary to each other, although we will not discuss it in our paper. 
 The paper is therefore organized as follows. The next section presents simple 
theoretical logic of our reasoning. The third section describes the varieties of strategies used 
by Kazakhstan as part of the institutional competition for mobile factors of production in the 
1990s and the 2000s. The fourth section moves to a higher level of analysis, looking at the 
involvement of Kazakhstan in the design of meta-rules for institutional competition, i.e. 
economic integration in the post-Soviet space, aiming to understand how changes in 
institutional competition and internal political environment influences the shifts of position of 
Kazakhstan in this respect. Finally, the fifth section concludes.  
 
2. Varieties of outcomes in institutional competition 
Institutional competition constitutes a large area of research in social sciences (Vaubel, 
2008). Basically, the literature includes six main perspectives on institutional competition 
among jurisdictions. The Tiebout sorting point of view assumes that institutional competition 
results in allocation of individuals in jurisdictions according to their heterogeneous 
preferences and thus improves the quality of institutions by ensuring, that they meet the 
preferences of the population, but also leads to the divergence of institutional systems 
(Wooders, 1999; Oates, 2006). The institutional entrepreneurship approach, based on the 
evolutionary economics reasoning, reaches the same conclusions, but stresses the role of 
learning and institutional innovations (Wohlgemuth, 2008). The race to the bottom point of 
view assumes that the individuals have homogenous preferences, and in the world of 
benevolent governments the institutional competition actually reduces the quality of 
institutions. For the regulatory competition it implies “zero regulation” equilibrium (though 
the outcomes may be different for product and process regulations with the latter being more 
susceptible to negative effects) (Scharpf, 1998). However, this view can also be generalized to 
the institutions like property rights and contract enforcement (Libman, 2008). This is also the 
prediction of the negative convergence point of view, which received relatively little attention 
in the literature (Oleinik, 2007). The difference between race to the bottom approach and the 
negative convergence approach is that the former stresses the role of preferences of mobile 
factors, while the latter focuses on mutual learning effects.1 The political economy point of 
view, unlike race to the bottom and Tiebout sorting, assumes that governments are self-
interested, and thus claims that institutional competition actually restraints their rent-seeking, 
thus improving the quality of institutions (Sinn, 1992). Finally, the varieties of capitalism 
point of view claims that institutions of individual countries are highly stable and their 
comparative advantages preserve the basic structure of economic order regardless of the 
mobility of factors (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
So, one obtains three convergence results (political economy, negative convergence 
and race to the bottom) and three divergence results (Tiebout sorting, institutional 
entrepreneurship and varieties of capitalism), as well as four efficient results (Tiebout sorting, 
institutional entrepreneurship, varieties of capitalism and political economy) and two 
inefficient result (race to the bottom and negative convergence). Inconclusive predictions of 
the theory match the huge variety of outcomes of institutional competition observed in reality. 
It is exactly the point where the sevenths perspective departs from: in analogy to the 
Ordoliberal point of view on market competition, institutional competition may be a function 
of the “meta-rules” governing the behavior of governments on the market for public goods, 
institutions and economic policies (Seliger, 1999). However, while in the analysis of markets 
for private goods the rule-setting function is left to an outside agent (the government), in the 
world of institutional competition rules are set by the competitors themselves, and, in fact, in 
a world without veil of ignorance in any form is also driven by the expectations for the ex-
post outcomes of institutional competition for the particular country.  
Interestingly enough, it is easy to obtain predictions for the outcomes of meta-rules 
design from at least several approaches. Tiebout sorting can in fact be easily adjusted to be 
used to study the formation, number and stability of jurisdictional structure instead of 
migration between existing jurisdictions, as it has been done in the literature (Demange and 
                                                            
1
 In fact, it is a very old idea. Adam Smith claimed that “there is no art which one government sooner learns of 
another than that of draining money from the pockets of the people”. 
Wooders, 2005). The simplified transformation of this theoretical literature suggests that the 
degree of decentralization (and thus, institutional competition) in an economy depends upon 
the trade-off between benefits of centralization and preference heterogeneity. Both political 
economy and tax race to the bottom point of views assume that the governments in order to 
avoid institutional competition will attempt to form a cartel on the market for institutions (for 
different reasons though: to protect rents or to improve welfare of their citizens respectively), 
which may be more or less stable (Eichenberger, 1994; Davis and Naughton, 2006). Finally, 
the varieties of capitalism point of view does not provide any general predictions for the 
design of meta-rules, but looks at the role of international bargaining trying to assess whether 
it is able to support the spread of particular varieties of capitalism (Callaghan, 2008). There is, 
to our knowledge, no literature predicting the endogenous meta-rules formation for two 
“learning-based” approaches: institutional entrepreneurship and negative convergence. In fact, 
following the evolutionary economics skeptical attitude towards monopolization of markets 
for private goods (which is especially pronounced in Austrian economics, cf. Rothbard, 
2004), the endogenous meta-rules in a world of institutional entrepreneurship are unlikely to 
restrict institutional competition. In the negative convergence world a de-facto coalition of 
governments is possible; but, unlike race to the bottom or political economy points of view, it 
results rather from ex-post similarities in institutional environments than from attempts to 
restrict institutional competition.   
Table 1 provides a highly stylized survey of the main approaches to institutional 
competition among jurisdictions. Although the differences between individual models are due 
to differences in assumptions, it is clear that in the real world for different regions and 
different institutions different outcomes are present, depending upon the type of institutions or 
region. 
 
Table 1: Theory of institutional competition: an overview 
Theory Driving force Convergence 
of 
institutions 
Efficient 
outcomes 
Endogenous meta-rules for 
institutional competition 
Tiebout sorting Sorting of individuals 
according to their 
preferences 
No Yes Multi-jurisdictional structure 
determined by the trade-off 
between preference 
heterogeneity and benefits of 
centralization 
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
Learning and 
institutional innovations 
No Yes Free competition of institutions 
Race to the 
bottom 
Pressure from mobile 
factors owners 
Yes No Unstable cartel of governments 
to restrict competition of 
institutions 
Negative Mutual learning by the Yes No Coalition of governments due 
convergence governments to ex-post similarities in the 
institutions 
Political economy Pressure from mobile 
factors owners 
Yes Yes Unstable cartel of governments 
to restrict competition of 
institutions 
Varieties of 
capitalism 
Interaction of interest 
groups of mobile and 
immobile factors 
No Yes Multilevel governance as an 
instrument to support particular 
varieties of capitalism 
   
The outcomes of institutional competition are influenced not only by the meta-rules on 
the market for institutions, but also by internal decision-making structure in individual 
jurisdictions (Heine, 2006). The way how governments adjust their behavior in the world with 
mobile factors depends upon how internal politics is organized. The incentives from 
institutional competition are channeled by the political system. First, the perception of effects 
of institutional competition is non-trivial and often biased (Heinemann and Janeba, 2008). 
Second, the responses of political agents often depend from their interaction with each other. 
Obviously, internal political decision rules change a lot also in turn of institutional 
competition; therefore it is more reasonable to talk about co-evolution rather than unilateral 
influence. It is also important to distinguish between interests of different groups and agencies 
involved in the bargaining with foreign investors, which may have different aims and 
interests. Anyway, without understanding the decision-making mechanism in a particular 
jurisdiction it is hardly possible to predict the institutional competition outcomes. Figure 1 
provides a simple overview of the decision logic in this case. In the approaches with 
benevolent government the  
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Figure 1: Internal institutions and competition among jurisdictions 
 
 
 
3. Competition for foreign investments: political bias vs. political survival 
3.1. Basic ideas 
In this paper we look at a very simple trade-off relating strategies in institutional 
competition to the internal politics: the interaction between political bias and political 
survival. On the one hand, the ability of regional governments to extract rents from individual 
policies is different (the similar idea in economics of conflict is referred to as political bias 
effect, cf. Jackson and Morelli, 2007). For example, the behavior of a modern government, 
which receives its revenue from taxes, is different from that of a medieval government or 
government in a country with captured firms, which receives its main revenues from private 
economic activity (Volckart, 2002). For the first the capital inflow means unambiguous 
increase of revenue; for the second there is a trade-off between positive effects of capital 
inflow on the economy and negative effects of potential competition for privileged firms. The 
relative weight of the latter may become especially large in resource economies, if the global 
commodities prices are high and the resource sector is captured. On the other hand, the 
decisions of the political actors are driven by the logic of their survival and increase of power, 
both due to the internal and international political competition.  
Kazakhstan belongs to the group of the resource-extracting countries; the importance 
of oil and gas and mining and metals sectors in its economy is substantial. From this point of 
view, given the relatively small population and unattractive geographical position of a 
landlocked country, natural resources constituted the main reason for Kazakhstan to be 
attractive for the foreign investors. Therefore the choice of strategy in the global institutional 
competition for Kazakhstan referred specifically to designing the institutional environment for 
multinationals in these sectors. On the other hand, the government with access to natural 
resources is likely to generate substantial revenues on the world markets, without entry of 
new companies and development of domestic economy. Hence, the political bias effect in 
these economies is clearly in favor of blocking access for multinationals. Throughout the last 
two decades the contradictions between political bias and political survival logics seem to 
have dominated the choice of policies implemented by the country in this area. 
  In the early 1990s probably the main goal for the government of Kazakhstan was to 
ensure stability of the country: in the set of the “triple transition” problems (Offe, 1991) the 
nation-building was probably even more important than economic and political reforms. It is 
obvious given the multi-ethnic structure of Kazakhstan (with a very large Russian minority) 
and the absence of strong separatist movements in the country during the Soviet period. In 
Kazakhstan the concentration of political power was substantially higher and the opposition 
was weaker, than in Russia or Ukraine; the support of the president has also been stronger. 
However, the main problem the political elite faced was a significant deficit of “international 
legitimacy”: the country had to demonstrate its ability to persist as an independent state both 
to its own citizen and to international community. Moreover, the 1990s were the period of 
relatively weak performance of commodities markets. In the contest of the economic crisis of 
the first half of the 1990s there was also a problem of critical deficit of investments required 
even not for development but primarily for simple survival of the country’s economic system. 
Thus, the predominant strategy in the institutional competition became to provide attractive 
conditions for large multinationals, also by fostering economic reforms. 
In the 2000s the situation changed: the political stability of the country increased 
substantially, but also the global markets entered the hype period. Hence, the effect of 
political bias became more pronounced. As in the majority of other post-Soviet countries, the 
political elites of Kazakhstan had well-established connections with a number of privileged 
business groups. While in the 1990s their ability to access the attractive assets was limited 
(because of the preferential treatment provided to the multinationals), in the second half of 
2000s the rents obviously outweighed the risks for legitimacy and the positive effects of 
foreign investors for the economy: the country therefore entered the period of re-
nationalization. The next two sections describe the problem in greater details. 
 
3.2. The 1990s: political survival logic 
In the 1990s Kazakhstan indeed achieved substantial success in terms of attracting FDI 
as opposed to other post-Soviet countries. In this period it ranked second after Russia among 
FDI recipients in the CIS (see Figure 2) and indeed outperformed Russia according to FDI 
per capita (see Table 2 and Figure 3) and FDI in percent of GDP indicators (see Table 3).  
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Figure 2: Foreign direct investments, net inflows, current USD 
 Source: The World Bank Group, 2008. 
 
Table 2: Foreign direct investment, net inflow (BoP), current USD per capita.  
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Armenia 1284.1 0.0 2.4 7.8 5.5 16.5 70.8 39.4 33.8 22.8 36.3 39.8 72.3 85.6 114.1 
Azerbaijan 0.3 0.1 0.0 42.9 80.8 142.2 129.3 63.9 16.1 27.9 170.4 399.0 428.1 200.2 -68.8 
Belarus 0.7 1.7 1.0 1.4 10.3 34.8 20.2 44.2 11.9 9.6 24.9 17.4 16.7 31.2 36.4 
Georgia … 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.1 49.6 54.9 17.2 27.8 23.5 34.7 73.3 109.0 101.2 239.1 
Kazakhstan 6.1 77.9 41.0 61.0 73.0 86.2 76.4 106.3 86.2 190.8 174.3 140.3 276.9 139.6 401.3 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
… 2.2 8.4 20.9 10.1 17.7 22.8 9.1 -0.5 1.0 0.9 9.0 34.4 8.3 35.1 
Moldova 3.9 3.2 2.6 5.9 5.5 18.3 17.7 9.0 30.8 13.3 20.8 18.5 21.8 50.9 63.1 
Russian 
Federation 
7.8 8.2 4.7 13.9 17.5 33.0 18.8 22.6 18.6 18.8 23.8 55.0 107.4 90.0 216.3 
Tajikistan 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.7 3.1 3.0 5.0 1.1 3.8 1.5 5.7 5.0 42.1 8.3 51.0 
Turkmenistan … 19.8 25.1 55.6 25.3 24.9 14.1 28.1 28.0 37.2 21.6 21.3 -3.2 12.7 149.2 
Ukraine 3.8 … 3.1 5.2 10.2 12.3 14.8 10.0 12.1 16.3 14.4 29.8 36.1 165.8 119.9 
Uzbekistan 0.4 2.2 3.3 -1.1 3.9 7.1 5.8 5.0 3.0 3.3 2.6 2.7 0.0 1.7 6.2 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, 2008; original accounts. 
 
 
Table 3: Foreign direct investment, net inflow (% of GDP) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Armenia 348.2 0.0 0.6 1.7 1.1 3.2 11.7 6.6 5.5 3.3 4.7 4.3 6.1 5.3 5.4 
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.8 19.7 28.1 23.0 11.1 2.5 4.0 22.3 45.1 41.0 12.7 -2.8 
Belarus 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 2.5 1.3 3.7 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Georgia … 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.9 7.3 2.9 4.3 3.4 4.7 8.4 9.6 7.1 13.7 
Kazakhstan 0.4 5.4 3.1 4.7 5.4 6.0 5.2 9.4 7.0 12.8 10.5 6.8 9.6 3.5 7.6 
Kyrgyz Republic … 0.5 2.3 5.8 2.6 4.7 6.6 3.6 -0.2 0.3 0.3 2.4 7.9 1.7 6.5 
Moldova 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.5 1.4 4.1 4.6 3.2 9.9 3.7 5.1 3.7 3.3 6.6 7.1 
Russian 
Federation 
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.6 1.7 3.1 
Tajikistan 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.7 2.0 2.3 0.6 2.4 0.9 2.9 2.0 13.1 2.4 12.0 
Turkmenistan … 2.5 4.0 9.4 4.5 4.4 2.4 5.1 4.3 4.8 2.2 1.7 -0.2 0.8 7.0 
Ukraine 0.3 … 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.6 2.8 2.6 9.1 5.2 
Uzbekistan 0.1 0.4 0.6 -0.2 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.3 1.0 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, 2008; original accounts. 
 
The annual growth rate of the net inflow of FDI to Kazakh economy from 1992 to 
2002 varied from almost -20% in 1994 to more than 1200% in 1993.  In the contest of the 
trend of FDI dynamics to Kazakhstan, stable growth of investment inflow in 1995-1997 is 
most essential. As opposed to Russia, Kazakhstan experienced limited decline in FDI after the 
crisis of 1998, since it had smaller negative effect on Kazakh economy (see Figure 2). As a 
result, in 2002 Kazakhstan outperformed Russia by at least 8 times by net foreign direct 
investment per capita (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Net foreign direct investments per capita, 2002 
Source: Finance and Development, 2003 
FDI flow was predominantly directed to most competitive sectors of Kazakh economy 
– mining, metallurgy, power production. For example, in 1993 72.5% of FDI in Kazakhstan 
was concentrated in oil sector, which accounted for 62.2% in 1994. In 1995 33.1% of the FDI 
was invested in mining, 20% - in oil, 16.6% - in production of basic metals. In 1996 32.8% of 
FDI was directed in production of basic metals (23.3% - in manufacture of basic precious and 
nonferrous metals), 20% - in petroleum (UNCTAD WID Country Profile: Kazakhstan, 2008, 
see Table 4).  
Table 4: Industrial structure of FDI to Kazakhstan in 1993-2002s. 
Sector/industry 
FDI, mln 
USD 
% of 
total FDI 
flows 
Total 14642.9 100 
Primary 9119.3 62.3 
   Agriculture. hunting. forestry and fishing 11.7 0.1 
   Mining. quarrying and petroleum 9107.7 62.2 
     Mining and quarrying 408.7 2.8 
       Mining of uranium and thorium ores 30.9 0.2 
       Mining of coal and lignite. extraction of peat 3.2 0.0 
       Mining of metal ores 363.3 2.5 
       Other mining and quarrying 11.22 0.1 
     Petroleum 8699.1 59.4 
Secondary 1329 9.1 
   Food. beverages and tobacco 434.8 3.0 
   Textiles. clothing and leather 1.7 0.0 
   Wood and wood products 10.9 0.1 
   Coke. petroleum products and nuclear fuel 201 1.4 
   Chemicals and chemical products 83.3 0.6 
   Rubber and plastic products 4.1 0.0 
   Non-metallic mineral products 20.3 0.1 
   Metal and metal products 492 3.4 
     Basic metals 491.4 3.4 
       Manufacture of basic iron and steel 39.2 0.3 
       Manufacture of basic precious and nonferrous 
metals 452.5 3.1 
     Fabricated metal products 0.6 0.0 
   Machinery and equipment 4.9 0.0 
   Electrical and electronic equipment 72.9 0.5 
   Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 0.8 0.0 
   Other manufacturing 1.82 0.0 
Tertiary 3832.4 26.2 
   Electricity. gas and water 349.9 2.4 
   Construction 84 0.6 
   Trade 145.3 1.0 
   Hotels and restaurants 21.5 0.1 
   Transport. storage and communications 345.3 2.4 
   Finance 252.5 1.7 
   Business activities 2507.5 17.1 
   Public administration and defence 126.4 0.9 
Unspecified 362 2.5 
Source: UNCTAD WID Country Profile: Kazakhstan, 2008. P.18. Original accounts. 
 
As a result in the beginning of 2000s foreign investors played a key role in several 
crucial industries, like oil extraction, power utilities and metallurgical sectors. The total 
number of FDI stocks in 2002 accounted for 15353.8 mln. USD (UNCTAD WID Country 
Profile: Kazakhstan, 2008). Under some estimates, companies with major foreign ownership 
represented 40% of the Kazakhstan’s industrial potential and 50% of its foreign trade in the 
early 2000s (Akhmetova, 2002). Indeed, although there have been many cases of 
opportunistic behaviour of the government trying to reformulate the previous agreements by 
tax policy or new requirements to social responsibility of foreign investors (CVEI, 2003, 
p.121), the influence of multinationals on Kazakhstan’s economic policy remained 
substantial. A particular feature of Kazakhstan as opposed to most other post-Soviet countries 
has been the access of foreign investors to key “strategic” resources, which were usually 
reserved for own oligarchs (Ukraine, Russia) or state-owned companies (Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan). 
How did the FDI inflow correlate with economic reforms? The first impression is that 
the Kazakhstan indeed implemented a more consequent policy of developing market 
institutions than other post-Soviet countries. Kazakhstan is now the “exemplary” country for 
liberal reforms in the CIS (like the Kyrgyz Republic in the first half of the 1990s), especially 
since the share of public enterprises in its economy is smaller, than in Russia after the start of 
the re-nationalization in the mid-2000s. The Kazakhstan’s experience of economic reforms is 
often cited in the Russian discussion of directions of economic policy as a model. The 
government of the republic offered unique guarantees for the foreign investors, e.g. 
introduced the production sharing agreement (as the first in the post-Soviet states). Unlike 
Russia, foreign investors were considered as the priority group, which received access to the 
majority of more attractive assets. In the second half of 1990s foreign investment to 
Kazakhstan was regulated by complex system of national legislative acts – Foreign 
Investment Act (1994), Act of Governmental Support of Direct Investments (1997), 
Investment Funds Act (1997), several Edicts of the President etc. According to these acts, the 
foreign investors were entitled to treatment not worse than domestic ones; there were no 
restrictions on investment to key sectors of economy; in case of change of national legislation 
hampering foreign investors, legislation valid in the moment of investment continues to act 
for 10 years after investment transaction. Kazakhstan also offered customs privilege, 
government natural grants and some tax remissions for the foreign investors.  
Kazakhstan carried out a successful banking reform, including the privatization of 
practically all banking structures (except the development bank), even the National Savings 
Bank, the improvement of quality of the banking system leading to significant reduction of 
number of banks (by four times from 1993 to 2002), a relatively early introduction of the 
IFRS/IAS, deposit insurance system (1999) and opening the financial services market for 
foreign investors. The reforms of the natural monopolies were based on the maximally 
possible development of a competitive environment by clear division of the monopoly and 
markets components. Since 1998 an energy market based on private generation companies, 
mostly private distribution networks and public long-distance network (KEGOC). The 
pension system of Kazakhstan is based not on the redistribution, but on the accumulation 
principle. The housing and communal services have been privatized. 
Kazakhstan`s success in liberal reforms was recognized by international organizations 
and rating agencies: Kazakhstan was the first CIS country that received investment rating 
from international rating agency Moody’s in 2002 and later in 2004 from  Standard & Poor’s 
and Fitch. In October 2000 the European Union raised Kazakhstan to the status of the market 
economy.  
It goes without saying, however, that the impact of multinationals on reforms was not 
unambiguous. On the one hand, it is obvious that foreign managers and experts provide (even 
unconsciously, but also often as part of the corporate policy) examples of behavior and 
implement (or support) rules consistent with the better practices from their home countries. 
From this point of view consistent liberalization and increasing presence of multinationals 
were obviously mutually reinforcing. However, foreign companies in economies with high 
capture level tend to pay significant unofficial payments to the bureaucrats (Hellman, Jones, 
Kaufmann, 2000). Similar processes were observed in Kazakhstan (Olcott, 2002). The things 
become even more complicated if one takes into account the de-facto decentralization in 
Kazakhstan, which the country experienced until early 2000s, which made regional 
regulations and regional protection even more important for foreign investors (Jones Luong, 
2004). Nevertheless, the policy of Kazakhstan in the 1990s seems to be relatively close to the 
political economy logic of the institutional competition: the government restricted its rent 
seeking appetites to support capital inflow from abroad and implemented a wide range of 
economic reforms to improve institutional quality of the economy. 
 
3.3. The 2000s: political bias logic 
 The 2000s witnessed a significant transformation of both external environment and the 
political situation in the country. The consolidation of political regime and the clear 
international legitimacy seem to make the problem of political survival less pronounced for 
the existing elite (at least supporting FDI could not contribute to it any further). On the other 
hand, the commodities markets situation improved significantly, creating large rents for those 
controlling hydrocarbons and metals. While multinationals indeed received access to the main 
assets in the 1990s, the government still established a network of privileged private, public 
and semi-private firms. During the late 1990s-2000s this network was consolidated and 
developed: first by creation of KazMunaiGaz controlling public stakes in oil and gas projects; 
then by establishment of Samruk holding, which includes all state-owned strategic assets, and 
finally by merger of Samruk and the state-owned investment fund Kazyna. The accumulation 
of financial resources by domestic investors dispersed the dependency on foreign capital 
observed in 1990s. In this situation the political bias is likely to receive relative attention as 
opposed to political survival logic, and the environment is likely to become more hostile to 
foreign investors.  
The empirical observations are indeed consistent with the predictions. In 2002 the 
government announced its intention to revise the conditions of existing contracts regulating 
the status of foreign investors. In 2003 the first conflict over the expenditures plan of 
Tengizchevronoil was resolved by the president, indicating, however, the increasing 
interventionism of the government. In 2004 the government received the priority right to 
purchase the shares in oil extraction projects if they are sold by their current owner. 
Moreover, additional restrictions on the share of foreign investors in selected industries (in 
particular, telecom) were introduced. In 2005 this regulation was expanded in order to include 
holding companies. Finally, in 2007 the parliament allowed the government to revise the 
conditions of contracts, if the actions of foreign investors significantly change the economic 
interests of Kazakhstan and threaten the national security. In February 2008 the government 
stopped any negotiations with respect to the production sharing agreements, although it would 
be too farfetched to claim that the protectionism in Kazakhstan reached the level of Russia or 
Venezuela: for example, in 2008 the foreign investors received additional benefits (vis-à-vis 
Kazmunaigaz) through new regulation of export duties on oil.  
The clear benchmark in the government-business relations was the Kashagan conflict 
in 2007. Kashagan, one of the largest oil fields in the republic, was explored by the Agip 
KCO international consortium. In 1998 the government sold its share to Inpex Nord and 
Philipps Petroleum and was able to enter the group only in 2005 at extremely high costs. 
After the new delay of commissioning was announced, the government requested an increase 
of the share of Kazmunaigaz in the project. The authorities used all possible means to support 
their claim, including accusations in customs, fire-control and environmental regulations, as 
well as amendments to the existing legislation. In January 2008 the partners of Agip KCO 
(Eni, Total, Shell and ExxonMobile) had to agree to increase the share of Kazmunaigaz 
according to the requests of the government from 8.3% to 16.8%. In June 2008 Kazmunaigaz 
purchased 51% of the shares of Mangistaumunaigaz from Central Asia Petroleum. 
Mangistaumunaigaz owns Kazakhstan`s first-rate oil-processing plant in Pavlodar and system 
of filling stations Gelios, thus the government of republic received the means of  influence on 
the dynamics of internal gas price. However, Kashagan is not the only example of expanding 
public interventions. The Karachaganak Petroleum Operating consortium (oil and gas) was 
accused of violations of tax and environmental regulations. In 2007 about 100 contracts with 
foreign investors were cancelled. The public sector, however, expands not only in oil and gas, 
but also in power utilities and mining sectors. For example, in 2007 the government attacked 
the American AES with assets in the coal extraction (for example, an antitrust accusation 
against AES included fines comparable to the overall 10-years investments made by the group 
in the economy of Kazakhstan). In June 2008 a partial re-nationalization of the non-ferrous 
metals group Kazakhmys was implemented (the government  rendered 7.7% of the shares of 
Eurasian corporation of natural resources to Kazakhmys in exchange for 15% of the shares of 
the latter).  
The lack of progress in improvement of investment climate in Kazakhstan in recent 
years was recognized by many international organizations. According to the World Bank’s 
Doing Business 2009: Country profile for Kazakhstan, Investor Protection Index for the 
republic is 5.7 (1 to 10, the higher the score, the greater the investor protection) for last 3 
years, however the rank changed from 49 to 53 during the year. For instance, the value of this 
index for Kyrgyz Republic is 7.7 (ranked 11), for Russia – 5.0 (ranked 88).  
To conclude, the political bias effect seems to dominate the political survival effect in 
Kazakhstan in the 2000s. It is however important to mention, that the shift of strategy is at 
least partly endogenous to the strategy implemented in the 1990s. Certainly, the positive 
development of global markets was necessary to ensure revenues for the privileged firms and 
was outside of the scope of control of the government. However, the reduction of importance 
of political survival effect is certainly an outcome of capital inflow. By investing in 
Kazakhstan multinationals at the same time support and strengthen the existing regime, at 
least, indirectly through improving economic situation, but also directly through participating 
in corruption networks and contributing to the formation of international legitimacy (see 
Bayulgen, 2005). In a phase of high commodity prices even significant expropriation threat 
still allows profitable investments; hence, businesses cannot credibly commit to “punish” the 
government in case of expropriation. On the other hand, given increasing political power of 
the regime, the political elite have an increasing incentive to appropriate the investments. 
Hence, the political survival logic seems to make place for political bias. 
 4. Global vs. regional institutional competition: strategy options and incentives 
While political bias vs. political survival logic seems to explain at least part of the 
evolution of the strategies of Kazakhstan towards institutional competition, yet another 
significant dimension seems to be the changing level of institutional competition, which has a 
pronounced impact on both available strategy options (through the meta-rules) and also on 
incentives of agents. The competition for FDI can take place either on the global level, where 
the key players are multinationals from developed world, and the sample of competitors 
includes a wide range of countries (though the relevant “reference group” for Kazakhstan 
mostly includes the developing world), or on the regional level, implying competition for 
mobile resources originating from the post-Soviet space (in particular, Russian businesses). 
There is of course an intermediate level of competition: for example, it implies Russia and 
Kazakhstan competing for investments from third parties, which are, however, specifically 
locked to the post-Soviet space (for example, due to some specific geographical advantages it 
provides).  
Kazakhstan has always been (at least, at the rhetoric level) one of the greatest 
proponents of regional integration in the post-Soviet space. However, the active participation 
in the regional integration talks in the 1990s did not actually result in the increasing presence 
of Russian multinationals in the country. In fact, Kazakhstan significantly underperformed in 
terms of attracting Russian FDI as opposed to Ukraine (with quite skeptical attitude towards 
regional integration) and even small countries like Armenia or Moldova (see Figure 4). The 
simple reason for that is that unilateral opening up towards large multinationals automatically 
put the recently established Russian corporations at a disadvantage. That is why their 
participation in the resource extraction consortia and the large-scale privatization has been 
extremely limited. Another reason is that the main businesses facilities in Kazakhstan usually 
have their “twins” in Russia. In the terms of abundance of enterprises open for purchase 
inside Russia and limited financial resources, Kazakhstan`s assets were simply less attractive 
for emerging Russian business groups. However, the situation changed dramatically in the 
mid-2000s, when the institutional competition between post-Soviet countries at the regional 
level became more intense. First of all, Russian corporations matured and therefore were 
more likely to compete at international level. Simultaneously potential of investment inside 
Russia decreased sharply. At the same time countries of the region entered a period of rapid 
growth, generating substantial capital flows worth competing. There are several aspects of 
this contest, which also imply different consequences for the quality of institutions.   
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Figure 4: Investment of Russian enterprises to CIS countries, inflows, million USD 
Source: Investment in Russia, 2008. 
On the one hand, the competition between Russia and Kazakhstan partly takes form of 
classical political economy competition, where Kazakhstan attempts to improve the quality of 
institutions to make the country more attractive for foreign capital. The establishment of the 
Regional Financial Center Almaty (RCFA) is an obvious attempt to attract capital from other 
CIS countries by providing favorable conditions. Yet another area where competition follows 
very much the political economy predictions is the competition for mobile labor. It is well-
known that Russia has been an important point of attraction for labor migration from Central 
Asian countries. Recently, however, Kazakhstan became more important for labor migrants. 
The main countries of origin for labor migration to Kazakhstan are Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz 
Republic; the migration is partly driven by a relatively large ethnic Kazakh minority in 
Uzbekistan. The number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan in Southern Kazakhstan (which 
seems to be the most attractive region for migration inflows) varies between 200,000 and 1 
million; however, the any data is likely to be extremely biased and is to be considered with 
great caution. The improving economic conditions and the weakness of xenophobic 
sentiments so popular in modern Russia make Kazakhstan an attractive country for migrants. 
However, the effects of institutional competition seem to be quite different if it comes 
to foreign direct investments of Russian multinationals. It is true that in the 2000s Russian 
business finally consolidated the strength necessary to carry out it expansion abroad. What is, 
however, even more important is that the businesses from Russia seem to at least partly be 
able to “seize the day” with stronger governmental regulations and less friendly attitude 
towards well-established multinationals. A good example is the conflict between the Canadian 
PetroKazakhstan and the Russian LUKoil over the Turgai Petroleum joint venture. The 
government actively intervened in the disagreement, mostly against PetroKazakhstan, though 
not entirely in favor of Lukoil; however, the Russian company succeeded in using the 
contradictions between foreign investors and the government to expand in Kazakhstan. Once 
again, Russian businesses proved themselves extremely capable to achieve success in “dirty 
water”.2 In fact, the “triumph” period of Russian businesses was relatively short and 
inconclusive; for example, in 2007 the Russian Access Industries was also among the 
companies with coal extracting assets suffering from state pressure. However, one can also 
look at the problem from another side: probably, the presence of Russian companies willing 
and able to work in a less transparent and more hostile environment made the very transition 
from the “political survival” to “political bias” strategy more likely!  
There are good reasons to believe that institutional competition in the post-Soviet 
space is plagued by the demand for bad institutions (Libman, 2008). However, the regional 
level of institutional competition seems to be quite specific not only in terms of agents 
competing, but also instruments of competition. One should be aware, that although there 
seem to be some targeted attempts of Kazakhstan to make the country more attractive for 
capital and labor from the CIS, the main competitor – Russia – is hardly pursuing the same 
strategy.  Moreover, Kazakhstan seems at least partly to benefit from capital flight from 
Russia caused by the decisions of former “oligarchs” to cut their business in Russia: for 
example, in 2005 Millhouse capital announced it plans to increase its presence in the oil and 
gas sector of Kazakhstan. If engaged in direct competition with Kazakhstan, Russia is using 
quite specific instruments of competition, far from predictions of the political economy 
model. There is at least one specific example at the intermediate level of competition – the 
contest between Russia and Kazakhstan for the Lufthansa Cargo main transit airport. In spite 
of the well-established regional integration infrastructure and good political regulations, 
Russia executed any pressure possible to force Lufthansa to remove its base from Astana to 
Krasnoyarsk (mostly through threats to revoke its license for trans-Siberian flights). 
Obviously, Russia’s position in institutional competition is motivated by a kind of “California 
effect”: since the economic potential of the post-Soviet countries is highly asymmetric, Russia 
feels relatively limited pressure to “catch up” with potential competitors from the CIS. Hence, 
the shift to the regional level of institutional competition reduces the incentives to improve 
institutions not only because they are less required by the demand side, but also because the 
                                                            
2
 Yet another example is the recent study of Transparency International (2008), which lists Russian corporations 
among the multinationals most likely to pay bribes to the local governments. 
major competitor does not really try to improve its position (or does it through non-market 
protectionist interventions). On the global level the situation is obviously quite different. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis 2008-2009 may impose significant adjustments to the 
regional level of institutional competition in the post-Soviet world. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The institutional competition perspective, complementary to the better explored geo-
economic competition perspective, is certainly able to provide additional insights regarding 
the development of economic policies in the post-Soviet space. Basically, this paper 
considered two main channels of influence of institutional competition on the quality of 
economic institution.  
First, institutional competition crucially depends upon the internal decision-making 
rules, which can be simplified to the “political bias” vs. “political survival” trade-off. We 
have demonstrated that the initial deficit of international legitimacy and economic crisis 
created a strong political survival effect, which resulted in improved economic institutions 
and progress of reforms. However, in the environment of institutional competition with 
substantial capital inflow from abroad, this equilibrium happened to be not self-sustaining; in 
fact, the same global institutional competition, which created incentives for improving the 
quality of institutions, combined with changes on the global commodities markets, eroded the 
basis for investment-friendly policies in Kazakhstan and supported the greater political bias 
effect. From this point of view, positive short-term effects of institutional competition in 
developing countries can be counteracted by long-term deficits of creating larger 
opportunities for rent-seeking. It is important to notice, that the problem is not just the moral 
hazard in presence of sunk costs: it is rather the overall positive externalities, which are 
created by investors supporting economic growth, than the pure ability to expropriate 
investors after they lose mobility, which drive the changes in governmental behavior. 
Secondly, we looked at the interaction of different levels of institutional competition. 
The literature usually restricts its attention to just one “market for public policies and 
institutions”, assuming its homogeneity. But in the world of non-zero costs of mobility and 
information asymmetry it is reasonable to assume that different regional markets for 
institutions will have different properties. This conclusion is trivial; however, the most 
interesting part is that the same country can “move between” markets, thus using a specific 
opportunity of institutional arbitrage. The paper does not provide clear evidence of 
endogenous shift of Kazakhstan from global to regional market for institutions; however, it is 
possible that changing attitude towards Russian investors was at least one attempt to shift the 
attention between markets. Further research of this shift, as well as of the relation between 
endogenous and exogenous factors and the impact of “geo-economic” and traditional political 
competition is still required.  
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